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About Your Masthead:
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Compatibility of
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Richard Delgado*
INTRODUCTION: FORMAL RULES AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
One day, a lawyer dies and goes to Heaven, where he is met
by St. Peter outside the Pearly Gates.
"What do we have here?" St. Peter asks.
"A lawyer," he replies.
"Another one. We've sure been getting a lot of those lately.
Well, what do you have to say for yourself?"
"I followed all the rules," the lawyer replies, modestly, but
with quiet pride. "I never broke any of the canons of profes-
sional responsibility, and I got all my briefs in on time. Except
one, when my wife had a baby. But the judge gave me an exten-
sion."
"Not bad. Did you represent plaintiffs or defendants?"
"Both, in equal numbers. And I was respectful to everyone-
my adversary, witnesses, and, of course, the judge."
"Let's see," says St. Peter, picking up a thick book marked
LEGALITY After thumbing through a few pages, he says, "Here
you are. Right there on page three. Not bad. It seems you col-
ored between the lines at all times. You cited case law accu-
rately, so far as we can tell, given the indeterminacy thesis.1
And you never coached a witness or engaged in a conflict of in-
terest."
"So, do I get in?" the lawyer asks, eagerly.
"There's just one more thing," St. Peter replies, picking up a
second book labeled JUSTICE. "Hmmm. I don't see you on
page three in this one." He leafs through several more pages,
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then looks up. "We'll have to look into this a little further Please
take a seat over there for a minute." Clapping his hands: "Re-
search assistant! "
2
The point of this story, of course, is that formal rules do not neces-
sarily guarantee justice; indeed some of history's most ignoble chap-
ters-slavery, Indian relocation, World War II internment, the Holocaust,
Operation Wetback-seem to have been completely legal at the time.' This
quandary suggests a second one that is the subject of this Essay: What is
the relationship between the group of largely formal rules known as civil
liberties and the set of substantive values known as racial justice or civil
rights?
The editors of CR-CL have invited me to offer my thoughts on the
relationship between civil rights and civil liberties. Both are emblazoned
on their masthead. A few years ago, one of my favorite authors, historian
Robin Kelley, wrote a prize-winning book about white media, black cul-
ture, and the huge gulf between them, entitled Yo' Mama's Disfunktional.4
Does a similar gap exist between civil rights and civil liberties? Is the
masthead dysfunctional, committing CR-CL by its terms to an inherently
self-contradictory agenda, like a law review that billed itself as "The Global
Development and Environmental Protection Journal" or "The Review of
Religion and Atheism"?
Are civil liberties and civil rights in tension, pulling in different di-
rections? Is it possible for a society to have both, in full measure and
without limitation? If not, should CR-CL split up into two separate jour-
nals? Part I of this Essay examines a few instances in which civil rights
and civil liberties may be entirely compatible. Then, Part II shows how
our system of civil rights and civil liberties can exhibit tensions and
strains, as exemplified in the area of hate speech. Part III explains the
source of these tensions, while Part IV offers some thoughts on how to
live with them. I hope that what follows will prove helpful not just in this
one area but will also enable us to understand better the relationship be-
2 This story occurred to me when I learned that a liberal legal advocacy organization
declined to send a speaker to a Harvard Law School program on the ground that civil rights
and civil liberties are exactly the same and cannot conflict. Telephone conversation with
Joi Chaney, Editor, CR-CL (Apr. 2, 2003).
3 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (declaring that slaves
and their descendants are not U.S. citizens entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizenship); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of
Japanese Americans). See also JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RE-
SOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 190, 317, 320 (2000) (discussing Indian relocation and
Operation Wetback, a Congressionally approved program in which at least 1.3 million
Latinos, many of them U.S. citizens, were deported in 1954).
4 ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, YO' MAMA'S DISFUNKTIONAL: FIGHTING THE CULTURE WARS
IN URBAN AMERICA (1997) (showing how establishment writers and social scientists depict
black "ghetto" society according to frames of reference radically different from those of
the residents of inner-city neighborhoods).
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tween civil rights and civil liberties in general. As you may recall, the
poor lawyer who spent his life maximizing one variable is still sitting
anxiously on that chair outside the Pearly Gates, waiting for the overall
verdict on whether his life served justice in the law.
I. SOME INITIAL INSTANCES IN WHICH CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES MAY BE COMPATIBLE
In one sense, civil liberties and civil rights are certainly compatible
in that they are both aspects of the good life. One would not want to live
in a society that scrupulously protected the interests of minority groups
and did not tolerate violations of their civil rights but denied its citizens
the rights of free speech, privacy, worship and assembly. By the same
token, one would not want to live in a society that safeguarded those
rights but treated minorities harshly outside those spheres.
This, however, is not to say very much about their fundamental com-
patibility. Civil rights and civil liberties may both be desirable, though
not simultaneously. When one legal interest is realized, it may interfere
with another.' One might occupy a higher place in our echelon of values,
so that we hesitate to advance the other at its expense.6 Civil rights and
civil liberties might not always be coextensive, so that one could maxi-
mize one value in certain settings without interfering with the other. In
other settings, the two might conflict.7 They may be only trivially com-
patible because of an unimportant element they have in common' or by
means of a bogus monetization.9
One can insist that another person's favorite interest, properly un-
derstood, is really an aspect of one's own,' 0 or imagine civil rights and
civil liberties only during good times, when society is faced with little
scarcity and people are on their best behavior." One can also frame the
5 For example, national security may conflict with the right of privacy.
6 One might argue that environmental protection trumps the right to drive a large, gas-
guzzling car.
I National security (again) may or may not affect the right to travel-by car to the gro-
cery store versus by private plane above a military base or to a theater of conflict.
I For example, the Iraqi and U.S. scrap metal associations might both agree that the
war in Iraq was a bonanza.
9 Recall how the Bush administration, in March 2003, called for a study to explore as-
signing monetary values to each of our civil liberties. The idea is that, in times of war, the
Executive branch would like to feel free to engage in surveillance of private citizens, read
their mail and credit card records, and see what books and videos they check out from
libraries. To prevent its doing so too cavalierly, the Office of Management and Budget
proposed to find out how much value citizens assign these rights; the government would
then weigh that against the value it placed on national security objectives. According to
press accounts, the ACLU thought this was a good idea. See Edmund L. Andrews, Threats
and Responses: Liberty and Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A13.
10 For example, some pro-development forces insist that environmental interests, prop-
erly understood, are really part of national energy policy.
" In an idyllic society in which few speakers use hate speech to threaten equality and
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issue as pitting a grand, systemic value against an individualized, par-
ticularized one held unreasonably by the other side. 2 For example, ad-
herents of free speech absolutism sometimes assert the worth of the gen-
eralized value society derives from our system of freedom of expression
in light of the momentary annoyance of a Latino or black who is the tar-
get of a single, isolated racial epithet. How can the temporary offense of
mere wounded feelings stack up against the tremendous gains, including
inventions, libraries, presidential debates, and PBS, that spring from our
system of free expression? 3
These efforts at reconciliation are unsuccessful because they dodge
hard cases, minimize conflicts that are real, or define the area of dis-
agreement in a manner that allows only one answer.'4 Using the example
of hate speech, I will demonstrate that the alleged tension between civil
liberties and civil rights is real, and examine what drives it and how we
should think about and learn to live with it.
human dignity, why would one need hate speech controls? Racist speech would carry little
sting, while protection against the rare case could chill legitimate expression.
12 In the free-speech-versus-hate-speech setting, see SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH:
THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 20-21, 165-67 (1994); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE
SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 212 (Henry Louis Gates et al. eds., 1994)
[hereinafter, Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech]; Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of
"The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1170-71 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter, Strossen, A Feminist Critique].
'3 Of course, advocates for minority causes are sometimes guilty of asking the same
sort of loaded question. They may ask how anyone could sacrifice their favorite value-
equality-for the mere momentary relief some Nazi or skinhead derives from hurling invec-
tive or burning a cross in the front yard of an African American family. See Richard Del-
gado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Narratives in Collision] (calling attention to this and
similar strategies on the part of the minority Left). Both approaches juxtapose an emaci-
ated, individualized, slice-of-life version of the competing interest against a robust, grand
picture of their own; guess which one prevails? See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFAN-
CIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND] (discussing this strategy).
'4 For instance, one might argue that equality is a matter of giving everyone enough
rights, and so civil rights collapses into-and is "nothing more than"-civil liberties dis-
tributed widely and impartially. See Peter Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 537 (1982) (making a version of this argument). If this were the case, however, the
problem with which this Essay is concerned would emerge in another form, since one very
large component of rights (free speech) would be at odds with another (freedom from hate
speech).
Similarly, the counterposing of a large, generalized value dressed up in dramatic lan-
guage against the opponent's value depicted in emaciated, unattractive terms is a transpar-
ent debater's device-the way one asks the question implies that only one answer is possi-
ble. See supra note 13.
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II. HATE SPEECH AND THE DEBATE SURROUNDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES
Free speech absolutists and critical race theorists have taken oppos-
ing positions regarding hate speech. Absolutists, including the ACLU,
maintain that a certain amount of vigorous criticism, even hate speech, is
inherent in a democracy such as ours. A vital liberty and a cornerstone of
democracy, speech must never be suppressed. In contrast, the Critical Race
Theory position holds that hate speech silences its victims, contributes to
a climate of disrespect for women and minorities, and undermines the
very democracy that free speech is said to undergird. Each side marshals
case law and policy justifications in support of its position.
A. The Absolutist Position
The national organization of the ACLU represents the absolutist po-
sition, that all speech should receive blanket protection under the First
Amendment. 5 Except for speech used in the furtherance of crime, few
restraints on its exercise are acceptable. If campus authorities wish to
confront a tide of racist slurs, graffiti, and e-mails disparaging students of
color, a speech code is not an appropriate remedy. Instead, it is argued
that minority students should learn to speak back or ignore the offend-
ers. ' 6 Authorities can condemn racist remarks, declaring them tawdry and
in poor taste. 7 Moreover, if hate speech is delivered in a way that in-
spires fear, authorities can charge assault; if the speech defaces university
property, they can charge trespass or similar offenses.' Civil rights and
minority interests are thus worthy of protection but only insofar as they
do not limit speech.
The absolutist scholars believe that both constitutional bedrock and
current case law support their position. Doctrines such as the prohibition
of content and viewpoint discrimination,' 9 Supreme Court decisions such
as R.A.V v. St. Paul,20 Texas v. Johnson,2 and New York Times v. Sulli-
"SSee, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE (1992);
ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING My ENEMY (1979); WALKER, supra note 12; Strossen, Regu-
lating Racist Speech, supra note 12.
16 See, e.g., HENTOFF, supra note 15, at 100-02, 111, 159, 167 (forcefully advocating
the talk-back solution).
"7 See Charles Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate Speech, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Hate Speech on Campus: A Mod-
est Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 562 (1990) [hereinafter Strossen, Hate Speech on
Campus].
"8 Nadine Strossen made this comment during a debate with this author at Cornell
University in the fall of 1995.
'9 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (2d ed. 1988).
20 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting hate speech and con-
duct).
21 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a flag-burning statute).
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van,22 and a trio of lower court cases invalidating university speech codes
at Wisconsin, 23 Michigan,24 and Stanford,25 all suggest that campus hate
speech rules are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
26
Still, a few cases can be read to uphold speech codes,27 and the be-
lated development of First Amendment legal realism 28 has been engen-
dering doubt in some of the faithful absolutist scholars. In response, they
have sought to fortify their position with policy arguments. One, the
"best friend" argument, holds that free speech is minorities' most reliable
ally. If those clamoring for hate speech regulation knew the history of
minorities in this country, the argument goes, they would realize the vital
part that speech, marching, and protests have played in the struggle for
civil rights; consequently, they would hesitate to impose limitations on
such a precious instrument. 29 A second, "pressure valve" argument holds
that permitting racists to unburden themselves of vituperative language
allows them to discharge anger that might otherwise explode in more
damaging forms, such as physical attacks. If outsider groups realized
this, they would stop demanding hate speech rules that only place them
in greater jeopardy.3 A third argument asserts that hate speech rules will
end up hurting minorities because authorities will inevitably apply the
new rules against them when they speak out against their oppressors.
Lastly, another absolutist argument holds that more speech is always the
preferred response to bad speech. Hate speech rules preempt private re-
sponses, so that minorities never learn how to defend themselves. Talking
back to the aggressor is empowering, while running to the authorities
whenever one hears a hurtful word increases one's sense of helplessness
and victimization.3" Free speech absolutists deploy such policy arguments
to reason that even if free speech law were to some extent malleable, de-
22 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (increasing protection for disfavored libelous speech).
23 UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).24 Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
25 Corry v. Stanford Univ., No. 1-94-CV-740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995).
26 For a review of the ACLU position, see Strossen, Hate Speech on Campus, supra
note 17. See also Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on Words that Wound, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983) (reviewing these First Amendment doctrines).
27 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding criminal libel stat-
ute in face of First Amendment challenge).
28 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990); Richard Delgado, First Amendment For-
malism is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169
(1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Giving Way]; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984).
29 See Richard Delgado & David Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate-Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 881-
82 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Bloodied Chickens].
10 Id. at 876-80.
1 Id. at 883-85.
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cisionmakers should exercise discretion in favor of the cherished freedom
of expression.
B. The Critical Race Theory Position
Twenty years ago, CR-CL published the first piece of legal scholar-
ship specifically addressing hate speech. Entitled Words That Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling," the article
reviewed a number of harms associated with hate speech and name-calling.
Urging recognition of a new, freestanding tort, I pointed out that courts
were already affording relief under such rubrics as defamation, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and statutory discrimina-
tion. A number of United States courts and a landmark Canadian Su-
preme Court decision followed suit.33
A few years later, critical race theorist Mari Matsuda, in a much-
cited article, urged that protection against hate speech should be ex-
panded to include public law remedies, such as criminal prosecutions.34
Then, in the course of a colloquy with ACLU president and law professor
Nadine Strossen, Charles Lawrence argued that Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation was a hate speech case, specifically addressing the problem of
campus antiracism rules. When the Court reversed long-standing prece-
dent and held that separate schooling sent a socially pernicious message
to black schoolchildren, Lawrence argued that it was tacitly holding that
certain messages of hate and inferiority should not be spoken. Brown,
then, would stand as a precedent justifying campus rules aimed at cur-
tailing racist hate speech.35
These three articles, and a book growing out of them,36 could be said
to constitute the first wave of hate speech writing and activism. The next
major development saw diverging lines of case authority and the advent
of a legal theory aimed at interpreting them. In the early 1990s, two fed-
eral courts endorsed the absolutist position in striking down campus hate
speech rules at leading universities,37 while the Canadian Supreme Court,
citing American critical race theorists, weighed in with a free speech case
asserting more or less the direct opposite.38 At the same time, federal and
32 Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action].
3 3 See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 13
(discussing this subsequent history).
'4 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
35 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990).
3 6 
RICHARD DELGADO ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, As-
SAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
37 UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. 1163; Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852.
3' The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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state courts were affirming causes of action for minority and female
plaintiffs targeted by hate speech in other settings, such as K-12 schools
and at work.3 9
Many people then questioned what was happening in the civil rights
and civil liberties arena. A second article in the pages of CR-CL posited
that the judiciary was belatedly beginning to apply the lessons of legal
realism to the First Amendment.' Rejecting mechanistic tests, shopworn
maxims, and per se rules, courts were beginning to consider a host of
factors, including setting, power disparities, history, communication the-
ory, and social science, on the way to a decision.41 Scholars addressed
each of the paternalistic objections to hate speech regulation put forth by
liberals4 2 and another "toughlove" set favored by the neoconservative right.43
These authors also examined First Amendment romanticism and the idea
that only by protecting "the speech we hate" can we safeguard the speech
we love. 44
Further scholarship built upon narrative theory and cognitive psy-
chology to address why more speech-an accurate, countervailing mes-
sage-cannot always counter the evil of hate speech and why judges find
it so difficult to balance free speech and extrinsic interests.45 Authors ex-
amined the experience of other Western democracies that prize freedom
of expression, but that nevertheless punish hate speech; 46 they demon-
strated that a climate of hate propaganda often precedes and accompanies
atrocities like Indian extermination or the Holocaust. 47 The debate over
hate speech, then, has become more nuanced, while showing no sign of
diminished intensity.
39 See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 13.
40 Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 28.
41 Id. at 174.
42 See Delgado & Yun, Bloodied Chickens, supra note 29.
41 See Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech
Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1807 (1994).
44 Richard Delgado & David Yun, "The Speech We Hate ": First Amendment Totalism,
the ACLU, and the Principle of Dialogic Politics, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1281 (1995).
41 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258
(1992); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Seri-
ous Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991). See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefan-
cic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes
So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful Speech].
46 See, e.g., Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech-The United States Versus the Rest of the
World, 53 ME. L. REV. 487, 489 (2001). See also LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCI-
ETY 38 (1986).
4 7 See generally ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002).
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III. THE SOURCE OF THE TENSION
If the hate speech debate highlights a tension between civil liberties
and civil rights generally, what is the source of that tension conceptually,
historically, and ideologically?
A. Conceptually
Speech and equality are, as mentioned earlier, aspects of the good
life. But they correspond to somewhat different facets. Like most civil
liberties, speech exhibits an individual dimension; it is an element of self-
expression. Unlike equality and civil rights, which are inherently social in
nature, liberty interests are ones we are capable of exercising by our-
selves. "Leave me alone; I've got my rights." "Stay off that property; it's
mine." "I'll say what I please, this is a free country." As our Critical Le-
gal Studies forebears pointed out, rights of this type correspond to our
individual natures. They separate us, emphasizing our individualistic, rights-
guarding, solitary tendencies.4 8
Although that characterization might seem needlessly dire, with hate
speech at least it may contain a grain of truth. Race may be a social con-
struction, requiring a tacit agreement to endow certain minor human dif-
ferences with great significance. But how do racial categories receive
their content, if not from a system of images, messages, media roles and
coverage, narratives, scripts, jokes, and code words such as "those peo-
ple," "inner city resident," and "unassimilable hordes"-in short, hate
speech?49 Defenders of hate speech emphasize its liberty aspect; detrac-
tors focus on its impact on social values and justice. The tension arises
from what each group chooses to highlight in its own and then minimize
in the other's position.
A second dichotomy, between capitalism and democratic ideals, built
into our system of law and politics takes on special force in connection
with hate speech." Our public law, as everyone knows, is committed to
radical democracy. All men and women are equal; one person, one vote,
and so on. By the same token, our system of tripartite government fea-
4 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does
the Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407
(1988) (considering the Critical Legal Studies view of rights in relation to minorities'
situation); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenol-
ogy of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563
(1984). Civil liberties may hold special appeal to those whose experience has taught them
that solo activity is the road to happiness and success; civil rights and broad social justice
may attract those whose lives have taught them the need for cooperation and community.
49 See Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra note 45.
50 See Richard Delgado, Where Is My Body? Stanley Fish's Long Goodbye to Law, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1370, 1384-89 (2001).
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tures a system of checks and balances, with each branch of government
playing its own role and limiting the discretion of the others." Our pri-
vate law, however, is based on libertarian principles and, in the market-
place, capitalism.52
This disjunction between a public law full of lofty democratic pre-
cepts and aspirations, and a system of moneymaking essentially governed
by the acquisitive impulse and protection of settled interests, rarely at-
tracts notice, at least when the two spheres are operating smoothly. 3 Hate
speech is a civil liberty that, much like most manifestations of racial dis-
crimination, distorts the marketplace so that private preferences operate
irrationally and are impervious to change. It also disserves the dominant
values of the public sphere, endangering democratic decisionmaking and
full inclusion.54 Regardless of the public or private terms with which one
seeks to justify hate speech, one finds little to commend in it. A strange
form of liberty, it wars with other liberties at the same time that it erodes
the system of mutual respect on which our society aspires to build a just
state.
B. Historically
If civil rights and civil liberties correspond to different impulses and
conceptions of national life, they also contract and expand in response to
different forces. Many free speech advocates seem to assume a romantic
dynamic in which both civil rights and civil liberties expand in response
to advancing morality. They believe that when we are good, virtuous,
generous, and mindful of our better natures, we expand both our free-
doms and the inclusiveness of our institutions.
Derrick Bell and other historians have shown that the interaction of
civil rights and civil liberties is more complicated than this idealistic
view.5 Civil rights expand most during wartime or periods of interna-
tional competition, such as the Cold War, when African Americans reg-
istered impressive gains. 6 Those times, of course, are when civil liberties
are most in danger of contraction. 7 Conversely, during times of internal
1 Id. at 1380-89.
52 1d. at 1385-89.
53 Id. at 1386.
54 See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183, 1189-98 (1993).
" See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
56 See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 79-114, 249-54 (2000). See also Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise
and Fall of African American Fortunes-Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369 (2002) (book review) (discussing Cold War tensions as con-
tributing to Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
57 See RICHARD DELGADO, JUSTICE AT WAR: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
DURING TIMES OF CRISIS 56-91 (2003).
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competition and scarcity, for example when jobs are scarce, the nation
experiences an upsurge in racism and a decrease in generosity towards
the perceived outcast.58 But domestic socioeconomic competition seems
to have little effect on our regime of civil liberties. Thus, the material
forces that drive civil rights and civil liberties differ. One could, of course,
still maintain that the two are aspects of the same broader system of so-
cial goods or ideal governance. But one would need to concede, I think,
that they flourish and contract at different times, in response to different
forces.
C. Ideologically and Constitutionally
The original Constitution protected the property and political inter-
ests of white males, while providing for the continuation of the institu-
tion of slavery in no fewer than six clauses. 9 When the Bill of Rights
added protection of speech, the Framers almost certainly had in mind the
speech, music, literature, arts, and scientific discourse of elite, educated
white males, rather than that of women writers, poets, anarchists, immi-
grants, or black slaves. 60 The document was, in short, stronger on liberty
than equality. The protection of the latter came much later, after a bloody
civil war and three constitutional amendments.
One could argue that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the First
Amendment an equality-protecting gloss, since a common legal maxim
holds that a later writing supersedes a previous one on the same subject.
6
1
But courts and the ACLU have not endorsed this argument. In the mean-
time, the two sets of constitutional values-protecting equality and safe-
guarding liberty-operate side by side. They enable us to say, at times of
crisis, "We may be sacrificing X-temporarily and slightly-but we are still
the Y-est country in the world." Embracing contradictory values enhances
legitimacy; when the need arises, one can limit one value and point out
how the other remains in full force.
Occasionally, one hears that it is the First Amendment that makes
America the most prosperous, freest, most generous country in the world,
with the highest standard of living and the greatest degree of personal
freedom. However, it may be that the exceptions to the system of free
expression, rather than the system itself, make America the country it is.
The United States today stands unquestionably atop the world in two
58 This socioeconomic competition theory of racism and discrimination was probably
first explained by Gordon Allport. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE (1979).
59 See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 45-48 (3d ed. 2000).
60 See Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful Speech, supra note 45, at 862.
61 See Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113
HARV. L. REV. 778, 800 (2000).
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dominant respects-military might and economic power.62 But if our
system of free speech plays any part in those achievements, it is because
of the protection we afford official and commercial secrets, inventions
and creative works.63 And, of course, everyone knows that the speech of
soldiers and government workers is much less free than that of the citi-
zenry at large.
Apart from economic and military power, the United States does not
stand at the top of the world. 4 A great income gap separates the richest
and poorest sectors, and the country also exhibits high rates of misery in
minority communities, including suicide, alcoholism, divorce, incarcera-
tion, and early death. 65 Hate speech and media stereotypes, which un-
doubtedly contribute to the discrimination that engenders this misery, are
free under current law. Free speech law, then, may contribute to the flaws
of the United States, while the exceptions are responsible for much of its
military-industrial prowess. Our reigning free speech ideology pays scant
attention to this, just as it screens from view the compromises between
liberty and equality reflected in the original Constitution. Thus, many
people would wrongly conclude that speech is equally good for everyone
and responsible for much of this country's wealth and well-being, when
matters are more complicated than that and close to being the other way
around.
IV. Is YOUR MASTHEAD DYSFUNCTIONAL?
How To LIVE WITH COMPETING PARADIGMS WHILE ON
THE LAW REVIEW OR ANYWHERE ELSE
We want and need both liberty and equality. Yet those two values
often are at odds. Hate speech may bring this conflict into bold relief, but
I suspect that examining other areas would reveal similar strains and ten-
sions between what we consider civil rights and civil liberties.
In part because we bring different histories to such controversies, we
tend to act as though one half of the problem is insignificant or should be
solved by the other side's coming around to our position. For instance,
when some people learn that a university is considering a hate speech
code, they will frame the issue as a First Amendment problem. This po-
sition then shifts the burden to the adversary to show that the interest in
protecting members of the minority community from insults and name-
calling is compelling enough to overcome the usual presumption that
speech should be free.
66




66 Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 13, at 345-46.
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Moreover, the university must show that no less restrictive means are
available to advance its objective of protecting outsider groups from dis-
paragement. It must also contend with a host of legal rules, such as the
prohibition on content or viewpoint regulation, 67 and maxims such as "the
best cure for bad speech is more speech."68 Furthermore, what of the de-
cisionmaker who will adjudicate claims under the new rules? Might he or
she not turn into an overbearing tyrant, imposing his or her own notions
of political correctness on an environment that flourishes best when speech
is free? For the one whose sympathies run to free speech, certain slopes
will look slippery and hard to draw. Couldn't practically everything be
considered hate speech, even Hamlet?
Others, however, will frame the problem in terms of a different value,
equality.69 Hate speech targets vulnerable minority groups by silencing,
marginalizing, and causing some to underperform or drop out. It teaches
all who hear or learn about it that equality and civil rights are of no great
value, and demoralizes those who would wish to live in a more respectful
society. This group will see nothing problematic with granting campuses
the power to enact reasonable rules protecting vulnerable members of
their communities in order to safeguard core values and institutional con-
cerns emanating from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments.7"
If one characterizes the issue in this light, a similar set of doctrines
and discursive strategies comes into play, but from a different direction.
The side championing the right of the hate speaker now needs to show
that protecting that form of speech is compelling enough to overcome the
legal system's usual presumption in favor of equality and civil rights. It
will need to show that the interest of the supremacist in hurling abuse is
discharged in the way least damaging to equality. This group, too, will
harbor concerns about the adjudicator of such controversies, but from the
opposite standpoint. Will he or she have a sufficient background in mi-
nority history, code words, and vulnerabilities to know what to look for?
A different set of slopes will look slippery, different lines hard to draw.7'
It is not just that the two sides begin with different constitutional
paradigms. Each hears and is attuned to different stories. One side will
see the issue as an extension of society's struggle against superstition and
ignorance.72 Its heroes will be Hollywood figures who stood up to the
67 See supra text accompanying note 19. See also Rodney A. Smolla, Information as
Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1099, 1122 (2002).
68 See supra text accompanying note 16. See also Felicity Barringer, Campus Battle
Pits Freedom of Speech against Racial Slurs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1989, at Al; Garry
Wills, In Praise of Censure, TIME, July 31, 1989, at 71.
69 See Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 13, at 345-46 (commenting on how
the adversaries' slopes always look slipperier than one's own).
70ld. at 346.
71 Id. at 345-46.
72 Id.
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House Un-American Activities Committee, martyrs like Socrates, Gali-
leo, and Peter Zenger, and theorists like Hobbes, Voltaire, and Hume who
defended the value of free expression. They will evoke struggles against
state-sponsored censorship, Hollywood blacklists, official religion, and
book burning.73 Juxtaposed with stories like these, the interest of a mi-
nority group in guarding against an occasional wounded feeling will not
loom large.
The other side, however, will tell a story of its own.74 That story in-
cludes World War II resistance fighters who stood up for Jews and mem-
bers of the underground railroad who risked their lives to help slaves
reach freedom. It includes Martin Luther King, college students who put
their lives on the line during the Civil Rights movement, and Mexican
farmworkers who picketed California grape producers to protest inhu-
mane working conditions. Compared to that stirring, centuries-long struggle
for equality and human decency, the interest of an ignoramus or white
supremacist in cussing out a fellow student of color will look pretty at-
tenuated.75
My view, and here is where your, masthead comes in, is that both
views are equally valid but not because they are complementary or coex-
ist easily side by side. They are no more compatible than a private system
of competitive free market economics that coexists with a public law
system based on radical democracy and equal participation.
76
Nor can judges easily and comfortably balance the two sets of val-
ues. Any new proposal (such as hate speech rules) runs counter to a host
of entrenched narratives. The judge, a member of an interpretive commu-
nity, will be asked to strike the balance in a way that changes the contours of
that community, 7  treating groups who are currently outsiders with greater
respect than that which they now receive. Judges are not simply balanc-
ing two discrete interests, like one neighbor's desire to have a fence and
another's wish to receive unblocked sunlight in her living room. Rather
they are deciding between two versions of speech/ equality, two interpre-
tive communities in which we might live. 71 It is easy to overlook that a
vigorous system of free speech requires a respectful audience, while
equality, at least in an instrumental sense, requires speech, remonstrance,
the right to petition and protest unfair conditions. Thus, speech and
equality both presuppose and endanger each other by mechanisms so
subtle and linked that shifting the balance in either direction from that to




76 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
77 Delgado & Stefancic, Hateful Speech, supra note 45, at 854-59.
78 Id. This, in turn, would seem to require a pre-political normative reckoning-the
sort of thing that judges are apt to be uncomfortable with, perhaps because relatively few
cases call for this sort of analysis.
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which we are accustomed is a formidable task.79 The group asking for
change can easily be seen as impossible, petty, humorless, or dangerous
fanatics prepared to sacrifice precious rights and liberties.
Still, one can reason around the edges. For example, concerted speech,
as hate speech is apt to be since it often targets the same victim time and
again, stands on a different footing from the isolated kind. Equality
means something more when a black undergraduate is told to go back to
Africa than it does when a shopper knocks some groceries off a shelf and
is reproved for being a clumsy oaf.80 We can expand analysis, as the legal
realists urge, to include considerations of power, communication science
and social theory in examining speech in different settings. We can, occa-
sionally, move each other marginally in a different direction, by force of
argument or an apt example.
Changing the way we look at core values, especially in relation to
others with which they hold a close association, is a challenging, some-
times uncomfortable task. Recall the lawyer we left nervously waiting to
find out his standing in that second book, the one that evaluated him from
the unfamiliar reference point of justice. I do not believe such predica-
ments are forms of cultural schizophrenia. Instead, I think the willing-
ness to confront social reality in all its guises is an indication of courage
and good health. CR-CL, in my opinion, should keep its masthead exactly
the same-but continue to consider, struggle, and reckon with the tension
it bespeaks.
79 Id. at 854-59, 868-69.
80 See Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action, supra note 32, at 136 (arguing that
racist slurs are more damaging than most other kinds).
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